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. 1
Bugge, Irene D., M.A., August, 1977 Psychology
The Use of Cognitive Strategies to Attenuate Test Anxiety: 
Attribution of Normality, Self-Instructions and Distraction
Director: Arthur L. Beaman
Three components of Wine's (1971a) Self-Instruction Training 
program were isolated in the present study and the efficacy of 
these elements in alleviating test anxiety in college students 
was assessed. The three treatment components were 1) rehearsal 
of attentional self-instructions, 2) an "attribution of 
normality" and 3) the distraction of the self-instructions.
Test-anxious college students were given five hours of task 
practice in one of the following five conditions: 1) Attribution
of Normality, Interpersonal Instructions, 2) Attribution of 
Normality, Self-Instructions, 3) Attention to Task, Self- 
Instructions, 4) Distraction, Pleasant Experience, 5} Standard 
Interpersonal Instructions. The results revealed that self- 
report measures of test anxiety decreased and performance measures 
increased from pre- to post-treatment for all give groups, 
suggesting that none of the experimental manipulations was 
effective. The failure of the treatment components to have any 
impact beyond that of repeated exposure to the test materials was 
discussed in terms of the methodology ernployed. Future research 
directions were also addressed.
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
ATTRIBUTION AND SELF-PERCEPTION THEORIES
Attribution theory is concerned with the processes 
by which an individual determines the causal relationships 
among behavior, behavioral consequences and the circum­
stances under which behavior occurs. The historical and 
theoretical foundations of attribution theory can be traced 
to The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations by Fritz 
Heider (1958). Beider was primarily interested in person- 
perception. That is, he formulated a motivational-drive 
model to account for how an outside observer perceives the 
causes of another individual’s behavior. The writings of 
Heider, largely theoretical in nature, were reformulated 
into a more rigorous research-oriented theory by Jones and 
Davis (1965) and Kelley (1967) and conceptualized within 
an information processing paradigm. The tremendous amount 
of research facilitated by this reformulation and the wide 
scope and diversity of subject matter classified within the 
attribution model are reflected in the book Attribution : 
Perceiving the Causes of Behavior (Jones, Kanouse, Kelley, 
Nisbett, Valins 8 Winer, 1972).
1
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2
One recent outgrowth of attribution theory is Bern's 
(1972) theory of self-perception. The theoretical struc­
ture of the latter is synonymous with attribution theory 
(Kelley, 1973). That is, the causal analysis proposed by 
Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelley (1967; 1973) by which we 
attempt to understand the behaviors of others can be 
applied when determining how we come to know ourselves.
More specifically, Bem has proposed that we learn of our 
own attitudes and dispositions, at least in part, from 
self-observation.
Bern's theory of self-perception proposes two basic 
postulates; First, "Individuals come to 'know' their own 
attitudes, emotions and other internal states partially by 
inferring them from observations of their own overt behavior 
and/or the circumstances in which this behavior occurs."
And second, ". . . to the extent that internal cues are weak 
or uninterpretable, the individual is functioning in the 
same position as an outside observer who must necessarily 
rely upon the same external cues to infer the individual's 
inner states: (Bem, 1972, p. 2). That is, Bem contends that 
we observe our behavior towards some entity, and based upon 
this self-observation we infer what our attitudes and 
beliefs are toward that entity. This process is especially 
influential when prior cues concerning that entity were 
weak.
This conceptualization of the process by which an
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
individual labels his internal states rests firmly upon a 
functional analysis of verbal behavior proposed by the 
"radical behaviorists" (Skinner, 1957), Skinner maintains 
that verbal statements of self-description, even of private 
internal states to which no one but the individual has 
access, are originally acquired through social interaction 
and are based upon public stimuli. This position, there­
fore, suggests that the evidential basis for the statement 
"I am hungry" is functually analogous to the third-person 
attribution "He is hungry" (Bem, 1972).
Empirical support for the basic proposition, that we 
infer our attitudes and beliefs from observing our overt 
behavior, was initially based upon Bern's "interpersonal 
simulation" studies which suggested a reformulation of cogni­
tive dissonance theory (Bem, 1965; 1967; 1972). Bern's self­
perception explanation to account for the cognitive disso­
nance phenomenon has generated a heated theoretical contro­
versy. However, the crucial experiment unequivocally dis­
criminating between cognitive dissonance theory and self­
perception theory has not been performed. The two positions 
have reached an empirical and logical impasse with no 
resolution anticipated (Bem and Me Connel, 1970). Hence the 
cognitive dissonance literature lends only indirect support 
to self-perception theory. Stronger evidence more directly 
supporting Bern's hypothesis can be derived from a bulk of 
experiments extending and expanding upon Schachter and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4
Singer's (1962) research on emotion. These studies suggest 
a corollary to Bern's basic premise, i.e. people infer their 
emotions, attitudes and beliefs from monitoring their auto­
nomic behavior.
AUTONOMIC AROUSAL AS A SOURCE OF 
SELF-PERCEPTION
In the classic study by Schachter and Singer (1962), 
subjects were divided into four groups. One group, 
Epinephrine Informed, received an injection of epinephrine 
and was told that the drug would enhance autonomic arousal. 
A second group. Epinephrine Misinformed, received an 
epinephrine injection but was told to expect symptoms that 
are not consequences of the drug; while the third group. 
Epinephrine Ignorant, was injected with epinephrine and was 
not told of any side effects. Subjects in the fourth group 
were simply injected with a placebo. Following this pro­
cedure, subjects were placed into one of two emotion- 
provoking situations. In one condition, subjects were 
required to fill out a questionnaire which consisted of 
insulting questions. A confederate in the room, pretending 
to be taking the same questionnaire, expressed outrage con­
cerning the nature of the questions. In the other, a 
confederate feigning euphoria was employed.
The major finding of the study was that subjects who 
were administered the epinephrine but were uninformed as to 
the drug's physiological effects (Epinephrine Misinformed
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and Epinephrine Ignorant) responded in a more emotional 
manner in the two emotion-provoking situations than the 
Epinephrine Informed group and the placebo control. That 
is, the emotional state of the aroused, uninformed subjects 
more strongly reflected the emotion--either anger or 
euphoria--exhibited by the confederate than did the emo­
tional state of the other subjects. Construed within Bern's 
framework, the findings suggest that the subjects informed 
as to the drug's effects attributed their physiological 
arousal to the drug, whereas uninformed subjects noted 
their physiological arousal and inferred that they were 
feeling either angry or happy based on the environmental 
cues. Subjects informed as to the drug's effects did not 
have to seek out an alternative explanation for their 
arousal.
Nisbett and Schachter (1966) in an interesting rever­
sal of the above study attempted to determine whether 
subjects could be led to reattribute stimulus-produced 
arousal to an external, neutral source. In this investiga­
tion, subjects were asked to endure a series of steadily 
increasing electric shocks. They were to report when the 
shocks became too painful to tolerate. Half of the experi­
mental subjects were given a placebo pill and told that the 
drug would cause hand tremor, palpitation and other indi­
cators of autonomic arousal (the usual physiological effects 
of electric shock). The other half received the same inert
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6
substance but were told that the pill would cause a different 
set of physical symptoms, not autonomic in nature. The 
investigators hypothesized that those subjects able to 
attribute their physiological arousal to the pill would 
tolerate more shock than those who could not attribute their 
hand tremors, palpitations, etc. to the drug. This hypothe­
sis was confirmed. The subjects who were led to believe 
that their autonomic arousal was caused by the pill tolerated 
four times the shock intensity that the other subjects were 
willing to endure.
Two studies extending the reattribution paradigm to 
other emotions have confirmed the original results. In the 
first by Ross, Rodin and Zimbardo (1969) subjects were per­
suaded to shift the causal origin of their autonomic arousal 
from fear of electric shock to the presentation of a loud 
noise. This réévaluation resulted in a reduction in antici­
pated fear of the shock. In the second study, conducted by 
Beaman, Diener, Tefft and Fraser (1972) high test-anxious 
college students who attributed their autonomic arousal, 
while taking a test, to a pill, subsequently reduced their 
scores on a self-report measure of test anxiety. This 
reduction in test anxiety remained stable at a six-to-ten- 
day follow-up. These subjects also reported less physiologi­
cal arousal during a test situation after the manipulation.
In an analogous manner, research concerning experi­
mentally-induced pain has demonstrated that the pain that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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an individual experiences is only partially determined by 
the pain-producing stimulus. For example, as was demon­
strated in the Nisbett and Schachter investigation, altering 
an individual’s perception of the causal origin of the pain 
can influence the degree to which that individual will rate 
the stimulus as painful. The significance of viewing one­
self as the locus of causality--of choosing to endure the 
painful stimulus--has also been shown to be a crucial ele­
ment in altering one’s perception of pain. Zimbardo, Cohen, 
Weisenberg, Dworkin and Firestone (1969) have revealed that 
subjects who volunteered to continue participation in an 
experiment employing electric shock and given little justi­
fication for continuing rated the shocks as less painful 
than subjects not given the choice to continue. Bandler, 
Madaras and Bem (1968) and Corah and Boffa (1970) also 
demonstrated that subjects given the choice to escape from 
shocks rated the shocks as more painful than subjects who 
could not control their exposure to the shocks. In addition, 
Geer, Davison and Gatchel (1970) revealed that subjects led 
to believe that they had control over the duration of shock 
administration exhibited less autonomic responding to the 
shock than did subjects who believed that they had no control 
over the duration of the aversive stimulus.
The therapeutic implications of the perception of self 
versus external control were addressed by Davison and 
Valins (1969) in an analogue of psychoactive drug therapy.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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It was their intention to explore a mode by which psychi­
atric patients could be weaned off tranquilizers. In this 
investigation, subjects were first asked to endure a series 
of steadily increasing shocks and to report when the shocks 
became too painful to tolerate. After this session, sub­
jects were given a pill (a placebo) which they were informed 
might have an effect on skin sensitivity and then were 
asked to take the same series of shocks again. During this 
series, the intensity of each shock level had been halved 
so the subjects thought they endured twice the number of 
shocks as they had during the first session. At this junc­
ture of the experiment, some subjects were informed that 
they had been in a control group and had received a placebo, 
whereas the others were not debriefed. It was postulated 
and found that subjects informed that the pill was a placebo 
would internally attribute their increased tolerance to shock 
and on a subsequent series of shocks would endure greater 
intensities of shock than subjects who attributed their 
behavior to an external source--the pill.
The far-reaching implications of such an attributional 
manipulation was demonstrated in a case study involving a 
patient suffering from chronic pain (Levendusky § Pankratz, 
1975). This patient was unknowingly weaned off his pain 
medication in a gradual manner, while learning self-control 
techniques to combat the pain. That is, he learned to attri­
bute the pain alleviation to the use of the self-control
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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procedures rather than the pill. When the patient was no 
longer physically dependent upon the drugs, he was 
debriefed. Although ethical issues involved in this case 
must be addressed, the procedure effectively eliminated the 
man's dependence upon the pain medication.
DISTRACTION
Concurrent research investigating methods to attenuate 
pain have focused upon the use of "cognitive strategies."
In general, these studies incorporate the redirection of 
one's focus of attention via 1) instructions to reinterpret 
the noxious stimulus through imagery or 2) the provision of 
distracting stimuli.
The studies employing imagery and the reinterpretation 
of the painful stimulus were originally derived from 
research in hypnotically induced suggestion. Barber and 
Hahn (1962) compared the analgesic effects of hypnotically 
induced instructions as compared to instructions employed 
with subjects in the waking state. Both were demonstrated 
to be equally effective. That is, suggesting to subjects 
while under hypnosis or instructing subjects in a waking 
state to imagine that it was a hot day and that the 2° C 
water in which their hands were immersed was refreshingly 
cool, both resulted in equivalent decreases on the report of 
pain as well as several physiological correlates of pain.
Current research in this area has eliminated the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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hypnotic component. The major emphasis of the research has 
focused upon determining the significant features of the 
imagery employed, i.e. what reinterpretation of the stimulus 
is most effective? For example, in studies employing cold 
water as the noxious stimulus, cognitive strategies such as 
instructing the subject to dissociate the cold from the pain 
and to focus attention on the cold was shown to be equal in 
effectiveness to the imaginai procedures employed in Barber 
and Hahn’s 1962 study (Blitz § Dinnerstein, 1971). Further­
more, in experiments employing a heavy weight to one finger 
as the painful stimulus, coping strategies such as imagining 
the finger to be numb and insensitive or visualizing pleasant 
scenes (a day at Cape Cod, etc.) during the painful stimula­
tion have been shown to be equally effective in alleviating 
the pain (Chaves § Barber, 1974).
Consequently, the crucial components of these imaginai 
procedures have yet to be determined because all have 
successfully attenuated the pain. Chaves and Barber (1974) 
have successfully isolated the client’s expectancy of thera­
peutic gain and demonstrated that the benefits derived from 
these cognitive strategies cannot be attributed to the 
expectancy effects alone. Although expectancy did produce 
some attenuation of pain, the cognitive strategies employed 
were shown to be more effective and therefore involving more 
than placebo effects. These researchers have also speculated 
that the cognitive strategies employed in the research thus
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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far have entailed "goal directed fantasies" and have ques­
tioned if cognitive strategies not having this feature would 
be effective. Future research isolating this variable might 
prove important. However, the question remains, what does 
account for the effectiveness of these procedures?
One viable hypothesis is the view that the process of 
distraction is the crucial component. It should be noted 
that the second cognitive strategy employed in the Chaves 
and Barber (1974) investigation--the use of pleasant imagery 
unrelated to the noxious stimulus--is closely aligned with
distraction, rather than serving as a reinterpretation of
the painful stimulus. Several studies comparing a variety 
of distractors have demonstrated the effectiveness of this 
procedure in attenuating pain.
For example, white noise, the tape recording of an
interesting story and the provision of a word association 
test, employed as distracting stimuli, have effectively 
reduced self-reported pain (Barber S Cooper, 1972). Simi­
larly, Kanfer and Goldfoot (1966) reported in a study using 
a cold pressor as the noxious stimulus, the use of self-pacing 
with a clock, the presentation of slides and the verbalizing 
aloud of the experienced pain. The first two procedures 
which distracted the subject away from the pain were superior 
to the self-talking procedure which focused the subject's 
awareness onto the painful stimulus. Finally, Barber and 
Cooper (1972) in an attempt to explore distraction tasks
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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that could be used outside of the laboratory compared the 
effectiveness of listening to a tape recorded story and 
instructing an individual to add multiples of seven aloud 
or to count aloud. The first two procedures were equally 
effective whereas the counting was ineffective. The 
authors speculated that the effective distractor must be 
attention-demanding, that is, sufficiently engaging to keep 
attention away from the painful stimulus.
It is apparent that both approaches--the cognitive 
strategies and distraction procedures--redirect the focus 
of attention; the first to a reinterpretation of some 
aspect of the noxious stimulus, the second to stimulus un­
related to the painful source. Furthermore, the attribution 
manipulations are similar to the cognitive strategies, 
i.e. the self-perception manipulations employ a reinter­
pretation of the locus of causality of the pain. From the 
evidence presented it can first be argued that the process 
involved in the cognitive strategies and the distraction 
procedure can be explained as focusing attention away from 
the painful stimulus. Secondly, it is a reasonable exten­
sion to speculate that the attribution manipulation may 
also involve distraction elements.
Mischel and his colleagues in a series of studies 
exploring delay of gratification, have also demonstrated the 
powerful role of cognitive distraction techniques (Mischel, 
Ebbesen Zeiss, 1972 ; Mischel, 1973). In the study by
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13
Mischel, et al. pre-school children were first asked to 
choose between two rewards--a pretzel and a marshmallow-- 
and were then informed that they could have the least 
preferred reward immediately or wait until the experimenter 
returned to the room and then be able to consume the more 
preferred treat. The children could terminate the delay at 
any time and would receive the less preferred reward. The 
effects of two distracting strategies on the length of time 
that the pre-schoolers would wait for the more preferred 
reward were compared. One group in this experiment was 
given an external distractor [a slinky) while the second 
group employed a cognitive distractor (the children were 
instructed to think about playing with toys and games, 
singing songs or anything fun). Both distractors were 
found to be equally effective in increasing delay of grati­
fication time as compared to children who were instructed 
to focus their attention on the positive features of the 
preferred treat during the waiting period.
In a similar manner to the pain attenuation studies, 
these researchers then attempted to determine the crucial 
components of the cognitive transformations and found that 
instructing children to think of "fun" things (the cognitive 
strategy described above) while waiting were superior to 
instructing the child to think of "sad" thoughts (falling 
down and getting a bloody knee). The latter produced short 
time delays; equally as short as those found when the children
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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were instructed to focus their attention on the rewards.
This study suggests that pleasant imagery may be easier to 
maintain than unpleasant thoughts and recommends the use of 
the former.
Finally, the distraction of attention hypothesis has 
been proposed to account for the effectiveness of systematic 
desensitization (Wilkins, 1971; Wilkins S Domitor, 1973; 
Yulis, Brahm, Charnes, Jacard, Picota § Rutman, 1975). 
Advocates of this proposition contend that Wolpe's (1958) 
claim that the effectiveness of systematic desensitization 
is due to reciprocal inhibition--the mutual antagonism 
between muscle relaxation and anxiety--is in error. They 
postulate, instead, that the critical variable in systematic 
desensitization is controlled attention shifts--the distrac­
tion of attention away from anxiety. In support of this 
hypothesis, Wilkins and Domitor, 1973, and Yulis et al. have 
empirically demonstrated that when attention distractors 
(auditory and/or imaginai) are used to replace relaxation in 
a standard systematic desensitization paradigm the modified 
systematic desensitization procedure is as effective as the 
standard procedure using relaxation. Hence it would seem 
that controlled attention shifts as opposed to the nature of 
the stimuli paired with the anxiety-provoking stimulus could 
be the critical variable in systematic desensitization.
These three threads of investigation suggest that 
attribution manipulations may serve to distract attention
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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away from anxiety. That is, the crucial component of the 
attributional change may not involve a cognitive alteration 
in perception of the anxiety but simply may provide a 
stimulus of distraction. However, the clinical applications 
of attribution theory focus on the importance of specific 
cognitive elements for understanding the attributional 
manipulations. Clinicians are emphasizing the significance 
of the altered cognitions, i.e. what does the client tell 
himself after an attributional change occurs.
ATTRIBUTION THERAPY: REATTRIBUTION,
ATTRIBUTION OF NORMALITY AND 
COGNITIVE RESTRUCTURING
The first therapeutic application of the reattribution 
technique was conducted by Storms and Nisbett (1970) in an 
investigation concerning the treatment of insomnia. It was 
hypothesized that if insomniacs could attribute the arousal 
symptoms which occurred at night to a drug rather than to 
emotional thoughts (which the experimenters reasoned kept 
them awake), then their insomnia would be attenuated. All 
subjects were required to take a pill prior to going to bed. 
The pill was a placebo, but subjects were told that the drug 
produced alertness, palpitation and high body temperature 
(arousal symptoms characteristic of insomnia). On the nights 
when subjects took the pill, the insomniacs reported getting 
to sleep more quickly.
In informal conversation with the experimenters the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
16
subjects in this study explained that they viewed their 
insomnia as suggestive of a more general pathology. It 
was speculated by the researchers that on the nights that 
the insomniacs took the pill they were able to attribute 
their arousal symptoms to the drug and therefore did not 
have to view these symptoms as evidence for their "abnor­
mality." Consequently, they worried less and fell asleep 
more quickly.
Storms and Nisbett then suggested that several clinical 
problems such as insomnia, impotence, stuttering, extreme 
shyness or awkwardness in athletic situations might follow 
a three-step developmental sequence: 1) occurrence of
symptoms, 2) worry about symptoms, and 3) consequent exacer­
bation of symptoms. They suggested that if clients suffering 
from these problems were to be given a pill to which to 
attribute their anxiety and arousal symptoms the second step 
could be eliminated and the cycle broken.
The deceptive nature of providing a patient with an 
artificial source to which to attribute his symptoms has 
some obvious ethical drawbacks when applied to the clinical 
setting. An insightful study by Svanum and Beaman (1975) 
suggests a second method of eliminating the worry component 
of the three-step process outlined by Storms and Nisbett.
In the third experiment of a series designed to assess the 
effects of the presentation of information inconsistent with 
an individual's self-reported personal qualities upon later
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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personality assessment, Svanum and Beaman investigated the 
effects of an ''attribution of normality." That is, high 
anxious subjects as measured by Speilberger's State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory, who read a high anxious personality, 
description and were informed that this statement was made 
by an "average" college student, significantly decreased 
their self-report of anxiety on subsequent personality inven­
tories. It can be speculated that a major component of 
worry which leads to exacerbation of symptoms is an attri­
bution of abnormality--a questioning of one's emotional 
stability. Hence, helping a client to view his symptoms as 
normal occurrences exacerbated by the worrying that these 
symptoms reflect some underlying pathology might be a useful 
therapeutic tool.
Davison (1969) comments upon this issue in his discus­
sion of "assessment therapy." He suggests that reattribu­
tion can play a significant role during the initial interview 
when a behaviorally oriented therapist explains the psycho­
logical process presumed to underlie an individual's prob­
lems. That is, the client is told that although his behavior 
and feelings may appear odd, peculiar or crazy such behavior 
and feelings can be produced in "normal" people if they are 
subjected to certain environmental-developmental situations. 
And furthermore, the acquisition and maintenance of his 
deviant behaviors can be explained within the framework of 
general experimental psychology. Although Davison claims no
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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cures utilizing assessment therapy exclusively, it seems 
clear that the reattribution strategy can be used effec­
tively to alleviate the patient's extreme worry about his 
symptoms.
Additional accounts of the use of "reattribution 
therapy" or "cognitive restructuring" in which the therapist 
helps the patient to alter his causal attributions by pro­
viding more reasonable explanations for his symptoms are 
largely anecdotal in nature (Rimm § Masters, 1974). How­
ever, two documented reports, the first involving the treat­
ment of a paranoid schizophrenic (Davison, 1966) and the 
second, children having difficulties in math (Dweck, 1975) 
can be found in the literature.
Davison (1966) in a case study with a paranoid schizo­
phrenic employed a reattribution approach which he labeled 
cognitive restructuring. The patient had been referred to 
Davison because he complained of "pressure points" over his 
right eye. He complained that they were caused by a spirit 
which helped him to make decisions. Davison suggested that 
the patient entertain an alternative explanation for these 
pressure points, i.e. that these sensations were a manifesta­
tion of becoming very tense in particular kinds of situ­
ations. Davison then attempted within the therapy room to 
enable the patient to see a causal relationship between 
tense situations and the occurrence of the pressure points. 
Relaxation training was employed. After one month, the
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patient began referring to the "pressure points" as sensa­
tions, i.e. the paranoid verbalizations were eliminated. He 
was discharged from the hospital, and at a six-week follow- 
up the patient reported that he could control the sensations 
with relaxation and no longer worried about them.
Hence, Davison’s cognitive restructuring appeared to 
eliminate the second step of the developmental sequence out­
lined by Storms and Nisbett by providing the patient with an 
alternative interpretation of his pressure points. Although 
the attributional approach was used in conjunction with 
relaxation training, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
elimination of his paranoid verbalizations was due to the 
former.
Dweck (1975) furthered the application of the reattri­
bution technique to a grade school population of children 
having difficulties with math. More specifically, the 
children Dweck selected to work with had extreme reactions 
to failure, i.e. they virtually stopped responding after 
making an error. She labeled this reaction "learned help­
lessness," after Seligman and Mairer’s (1967) usage. In an 
earlier study, Dweck and Repucci (1973) had found that such 
learned helpless children assumed less personal responsi­
bility for their behavior than did "persevering" children 
(those who did not quit after meeting a failure experience). 
However, to the extent that the learned helpless children
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did view themselves as the locus of causality, they tended 
to attribute their successes and failures to ability rather 
than effort. It was hypothesized by Dweck therefore that a 
treatment procedure which focused upon 1) helping the 
children to assume personal responsibility for their 
successes and failures and 2) altering their attribution of 
causality from ability to effort, especially regarding 
failure situations, would facilitate improved performance in 
arithmetic.
In her 1975 study, Dweck assessed the effectiveness of 
this attribution retraining program as compared to a success- 
only treatment group with learned helpless children. Train­
ing in both conditions consisted of 25 sessions in a 1-1 
tutorial situation during which the children worked on a 
series of arithmetic problems. In the attribution group, 
failure experiences were programmed into each session, 
following which the tutor would inform the child that he 
failed becaused he did not try hard enough. In the 
success-only group, the children did not encounter failure. 
(Dweck viewed this group as similar to many programmed 
learning and behavior modification programs.) The results 
indicated that subjects in the attribution group 1) maintained 
or improved their performance on math problems and 
2) increased the degree to which they attributed their 
failure to lack of effort as opposed to lack of ability.
The success-only group continued to evidence the learned
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helpless response after encountering failure and did not 
alter their attribution regarding the source of their 
failure.
COGNITIVE BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION 
(SELF-INSTRUCTION TRAINING)
The attribution therapies outlined in the previous 
section closely resemble cognitive-behavioral treatment 
approaches which emphasize the alteration of patterns of 
thinking in order to effect behavior change. A plethora of 
cognitive-behavioral approaches have emerged (see Mahoney, 
1974, for a review); two of the most representative are 
Rational-Emotive Therapy (Ellis, 1962) and Self-Instruction 
Training (Meichenbaura S Goodman, 1971). Ellis contends 
that irrational beliefs are at the root of most psychological 
disturbances. Rational-Emotive Therapy, therefore, employs 
the use of logical arguments to challenge the irrational 
beliefs and replace these self-defeating thoughts with more 
adaptive ones. Although also focusing upon the modification 
of cognition, Meichenbaum and others employing Self- 
Instruction Training deemphasize the importance of isolating 
the self-defeating beliefs and, rather, train clients to 
emit adaptive self-statements.
The theoretical underpinnings of Self-Instruction 
Training were primarily derived from the writings of Luria 
(1961; 1969) and Vygotsky (1962). Luria described a
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three-stage developmental sequence to account for the 
acquisition of behavioral control by private speech.
Initially, the child's behavior is hypothesized to be 
governed by the speech of others. As the child begins to 
acquire language skills, his behavior comes to be controlled 
by overt self-talk. This self-talk fades and is believed 
to be internalized resulting in the final phase of covert 
speech, that is, behavior controlled by covert speech.
Empirical evidence demonstrating the self-directing 
function of speech on task performance has been drived from 
a number of sources (Bern, 1967; Birch, 1966; Lovaas, 1964;
Me Guigan, 1970; Meichenbaum, 1969a, 1969b). These 
pioneering studies led investigators to examine the clinical 
benefits that might accrue from explicitly training clients 
to talk to themselves in a self-guiding manner. For example, 
Geibink, Stover and Fahl (1968) taught emotionally disturbed 
boys more adaptive responses to frustration via self- 
instructions. And Palkes, Steward and Kahana (1968) and 
Palkes, Steward and Freedman (1972) employed self-instructions 
to facilitate the performance of hyperactive children on the 
Porteus Maze Test.
In 1971, Meichenbaum and Goodman employed a modeling 
and self-instruction rehearsal procedure with a population 
of impulsive pre-school children. This training procedure 
was deemed a particularly promising approach because impul­
sive children were found to be less able to control their
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behavior via private speech than were reflective children 
(Meichenbaum S Goodman, 1969a). Training in self-guidance 
followed a five-step sequence in which the experimenter 
modeled the performance of a variety of tasks (one per 
training unit) while the child simply observed, followed by 
four trials in which the child performed the task, first 
with the aid of the model's instructions, next with the 
child verbalizing the instructions aloud, then self-instruc­
ting in a whisper and finally performing the task while 
covertly instructing himself. Following the treatment 
sessions, impulsive children trained in the self-instruction 
group performed significantly better on a series of per­
formance measures as compared to two control groups.
In the second experiment of the Meichenbaum and 
Goodman (1971) study, the researchers attempted to isolate 
the crucial elements of the treatment package. This study 
revealed that behavioral rehearsal was the sine qua non of 
the training procedure. That is, observation of a model 
emitting self-instructions did not facilitate behavior 
change; it was necessary for the impulsive child to engage 
in self-instructions while performing the tasks.
Subsequent applications of Self-Instruction Training 
have incorporated a variety of procedures ranging from the 
strict adherence to the five-step process outlined by 
Meichenbaum and Goodman to merely instructing subjects to 
covertly talk to themselves with no checks on whether or not
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the instructions were carried out and no controls on the 
specific content of the self-verbalizations. For example, 
Meichenbaum and Cameron (1973) trained hospitalized schizo­
phrenics to self-instruct via a modeling and cognitive- 
rehearsal program analogous to the procedure used with impul 
sive children. The schizophrenics' performance on a 
variety of tasks was significantly improved following train­
ing in which they were taught to use self-instruction such 
as "pay attention, listen and repeat instructions, disregard 
distraction," as compared to controls who received practice 
on the tasks but no Self-Instruction Training. A much less 
structured procedure, also falling under the rubric of 
Self-Instruction Training, was employed to alleviate pre- 
surgery distress in hospitalized patients (Langer, Janis G 
Wolfer, 1975). In this investigation several procedures 
designed to reduce anxiety were compared. The most effec­
tive procedure was found to be a coping device by which 
patients were instructed to direct their attention away 
from the negative thoughts regarding the surgery and rather 
focus on the more favorable aspects of hospitalization.
Current research directions in the area of self- 
instruction have been aimed at 1) more rigorously defining 
the self-instruction package employed and attempting to iso­
late the active treatment components of this package (Robin, 
Armel 5 L ’Leary, 1975), 2) attempting to determine the 
classes of target behaviors for which Self-Instruction
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Training is most effective (Bernstein § Quevillon, 1976) 
and 3} examining the content of the self-instructions 
(Kanfer, Karoly  ̂ Newman, 1975; Hartig § Kanfer, 1973).
In the study by Kanfer, Karoly and Newman, the effec­
tiveness of three different self-statements in helping dark 
"phobic" children cope with the dark were contrasted. One 
group of children was instructed to say, "I am a brave boy 
(girl), I can take care of myself in the dark." A second 
group was instructed to verbalize, "The dark is a fun place 
to be. There are many good things in the dark." The third 
group simply recited, "Mary had a little lamb its fleece was 
white as snow." The results revealed that the self-statements 
of the first group whose content focused on the active 
coping with the stressful situation was more effective than 
the self-instructions in the second group that emphasized 
the pleasant aspects of the dark. However, both were more 
effective than the group employing the nursery rhyme.
In the self-control study by Hartig and Kanfer (1973), 
five different contents of self-talk in a delay of gratifi­
cation paradigm were compared. These researchers found no 
differences between one group of children instructed to 
state, "I must not look at the toy," a second group making 
the former statement and then focusing on the positive 
aspects of not looking at the toy, "I will be a good boy 
(girl)," and a third group making the original statement and 
then focusing on the negative consequences, "I will be a bad
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boy (girl) if I look." All three groups were able to delay 
their gratification significantly longer than a group 
employing the recitation of the rhyme "Hickory, dickory, 
dock" and a group using no self-verbalizations.
It is clear that these two studies do not definitively 
answer the question on the importance of the content of the 
self-instructions. The use of the well-known nursery rhymes 
as controls does not rule out the possibility that self- 
instructions serve a distraction function. Although Kanfer 
et al. obtained differential results using two different 
self-instructions, the self-statement that proved less 
effective focused the subject's attention on the feared 
stimulus--the dark. Again, this finding does not eliminate 
the viability of the distraction hypothesis. Meichenbaum 
(1975) has emphasized the importance of the use of self- 
instructions that are not rote-memory-like. The distraction 
literature as well emphasizes the importance of employing 
attention-demanding cognitive strategies and of focusing 
attention away from the anxiety-engendering stimulus.
In addition to these varied applications, the useful­
ness of including self-instructions as an adjunct to several 
behavior therapy techniques has been investigated. Behavioral 
methods such as systematic desentization, modeling, anxiety 
relief and aversive conditioning have been modified to 
incorporate self-instructions into the treatment package 
(Meichenbaum S Cameron, 1974). Problems addressed via these
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approaches included speech anxiety (Meichenbaum, Gilmore G 
Fedoravicius, 1971), phobias, lack of creativity and 
smoking (Meichenbaum § Cameron, 1974). Two of the most 
interesting studies exploring traditional behavior therapy 
approaches and Self-Instruction Training were concerned with 
the treatment of test anxiety (Wine, 1971b; Meichenbaum, 
1 9 7 2 ) .
APPLICATION OF COGNITIVE MODIFICATION 
TO TEST ANXIETY
Research in the area of test anxiety reveals that, in 
general, highly test-anxious individuals perform more poorly 
in stressful, evaluative testing situations than do low test- 
anxious persons. When given achievement orienting instruc­
tions prior to a test administration, high test-anxious 
individuals have been shown to be more internally focused 
and hence less attentive to the task. The research indicated 
that under stressful testing conditions, high test-anxious 
individuals tend to 1) worry about their performance and 
that of others, 2) engage in excessive rumination over 
alternatives on the task, 3) engage in self-deprecatory 
thinking such as feelings of inadequacy, fear of loss of 
status or self-esteem and fear of punishment and 4) manifest 
heightened autonomic reactions (Wine, 1971b; Meichenbaum, 
1 9 7 2 ) .
Liebert and Morris (1967) in their conceptualization
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
28
of test anxiety have proposed that there are two major com­
ponents, worry and emotionality. The worry component is 
defined as cognitive concern regarding performance, while 
the emotionality aspect involves the physiological arousal 
experienced (anxiety). Based upon a series of studies 
relating worry and emotionality scores with performance 
expectancy, task performance and final examination grades, 
Morris and Liebert (1969) concluded that "it is worry, not 
'anxiety,' which affects performance of intellectual- 
cognitive tasks and which interacts with the relevant vari­
ables of the test situation" (pp. 243-244).
Support for this assertion concerning the preeminence 
of cognitive variables in test anxiety can be derived from 
studies revealing the differential effects of instructions 
on performance. That is, although performance by test- 
anxious persons is debilitated under "ego-involving" 
instructions, high test-anxious subjects perform in a 
superior fashion to low anxious subjects when the instructions 
are not evaluative (Wine, 1971b).
A study by Sarason (1958) involving reassurance
instructions further demonstrates the significant effects
of instructions on the performance of test anxious subjects.
In his investigation the following pre-test instructions
were given to high test-anxious subjects:
Many people get unduly upset and tense because they 
do not learn the lists in just a few trials. If you 
don't worry about how you are doing but rather just
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concentrate on the list, you will find you learn 
much more easily. These kinds of lists are hard 
so it is no surprise or matter of concern if you 
progress slowly at first and make mistakes 
[p. 474].
These instructions facilitated the performance of high 
test-anxious subjects. It should be noted that these 
instructions incorporate an attribution of normality:
"Many people get unduly upset and tense because they do not 
learn the lists in just a few trials," which may account 
for the effectiveness of these instructions in facilitating 
the performance of high test-anxious subjects. Wine (1971b) 
contends, however, that the inclusion of the instruction, 
"just concentrate on the list," facilitated the focusing 
of attention on the task and was the crucial component of 
the instructions.
Ignoring at present these differing interpretations 
of the instructions, this brief discussion of the test 
anxiety literature suggests that a treatment approach 
designed to diminish the worry component and enhance atten­
tion to the task would facilitate both decreases in test 
anxiety and increases in performance.
The cognitive modification package which Meichenbaum 
(1972) developed addresses these central issues. This pro­
cedure involved a three-step process. First, via group 
discussion test-anxious subjects gained "insight" into their 
self-verbalizations emitted prior to and during test taking. 
Second, the subjects were trained in relaxation and to emit
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self-instructions to relax and to be task relevant. In the 
final step, subjects employed these self-instructions and 
relaxation techniques while visualizing the hierarchy 
scenes. That is, subjects were trained to use "coping 
imagery" in which they imagined themselves coping with their 
anxiety via slow deep breaths and self-instructions.
The results indicated that this cognitive modification 
procedure was significantly more effective than standard 
systematic desensitization in reducing test anxiety as 
measured by an analog test situation employing Raven's 
Matrices (1956) and Brown's (1969) Digit Symbol Test, self- 
report measures of test anxiety and GPA. Furthermore, only 
the cognitive modification group changed its perception of 
anxiety from debilitative to facilitative. That is, via 
the treatment procedure these subjects relabeled their 
arousal as a cue to be task relevant, rather than as an 
indicator of impending failure.
Wine (1971a) also explored the applicability of self- 
instructional training for the attenuation of test anxiety 
in a sophisticated design comparing three treatment packages. 
In the first treatment group, Attentional Training, sub­
jects were given a treatment rationale that attributed a 
test-anxious individual's poor performance on tests to the 
fact that such people engaged in self-evaluative worrying 
that distracted their attention away from the task. The 
goal of treatment was to train the test-anxious individuals
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to focus their attention onto tasks. In order to achieve 
this aim, videotapes of models demonstrating inappropriate 
and appropriate self-talk procedures for dealing with test 
anxiety plus actual practice in the six treatment sessions 
was employed. The second treatment package incorporated 
all of the components of the Attentional Training group plus 
deep muscle relaxation training. The final group, Self- 
Attending, was informed that treatment would facilitate self- 
awareness and an understanding of the origins of the test 
anxiety. These subjects worked on the same practice tasks 
as the first two groups during the six sessions, but were 
instructed to attend to how they were feeling during the 
test taking.
The results revealed that the Attentional Training 
group and the Attentional Training Plus Relaxation group were 
equally effective in decreasing test anxiety as measured 
by self-report inventories and facilitating performance on 
Brown's Digit Symbol Test and the Wonderlic (1959) Personnel 
Test. That is, the inclusion of relaxation training did 
not enhance treatment effectiveness. The Self-Attending 
group did not change significantly on any of the outcome 
measures. Wine concluded that her results confirm that 
test anxiety can be defined attentionally and that her pro­
cedure offers a viable alternative to the use of systematic 
desensitization.
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THEORETICAL RATIONALE FOR COGNITIVE 
BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION
Meichenbaum (1975) in an attempt to explain why the 
cognitive behavior modification procedures are effective 
offers three probable explanations. First, he contends 
that self-instructions function in a similar manner to 
interpersonal instructions. That is, instructions 
a) initiate performance, b) direct attention to the task,
c) clarify the performance requirements of a task and
d) limit one's response repertoire in the situation via 
instructions not to make certain responses. Second, self- 
instructions direct attention to the task as a continual 
process, not just once at the beginning of a task as in 
interpersonal instructions. And third, self-instructions 
can facilitate an attributional change regarding physio­
logical state. Finally, Meichenbaum concluded that in 
order for Self-Instruction Training to be successful, the 
self-instructions must be specific, not too general or 
rote-memory-like and the self-statements must be employed 
in the problem situations; simply saying them to self is 
not sufficient.
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Chapter 2 
RATIONALE OF PRESENT STUDY
The present study was designed to extend the work of 
Meichenbaum (1972) and Wine (1971a, 1971b) in the area of 
test anxiety and to explore in greater detail Meichenbaum*s 
(1975) theoretical rationale for the efficacy of his Self- 
Instruction Training procedure. Wine (1971a) demonstrated 
the usefulness of a Self-Instruction Training program for 
the alleviation of test anxiety. Although Wine's treatment 
procedure also included a comprehensive treatment rationale, 
group discussion sessions in which subjects explored their 
mutual thoughts, feelings and reactions to tests and the 
employment of videotaped models, the treatment component 
deemed most crucial by Wine was the rehearsal of self- 
instructions to attend to the task while engaged in the 
analogue testing situations. Hence this component was iso­
lated in the present investigation and the efficacy of this 
procedure was compared with two additional components of 
Wine's treatment package, postulated by the present author 
to be potential change agents, the first the "attribution of 
normality" and the second, distraction.
33
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It can be argued that an essential feature of the 
group discussions in Wine's study was an "attribution of 
normality." The subjects were encouraged to explore their 
mutual thoughts, feelings and reactions toward test taking 
during the group meetings. It can be speculated that these 
subjects learned that their responses to tests were not 
unique and came to view their anxiety as "normal." Two 
empirical investigations have revealed that labeling anxiety 
as normal can effectively reduce anxiety. Sarason (1958) 
demonstrated that test-anxious subjects given reassurance 
instructions which described anxiety reactions to the test 
materials as common, performed in a superior fashion to 
those test-anxious subjects not provided with these instruc­
tions. In 1975, Svanum  ̂ Beaman demonstrated that high 
anxious subjects led to believe that high levels of anxiety 
were typical of the average college student lowered their 
subsequent self-report of their anxiety.
Normality therefore was incorporated into the present 
work and its impact was assessed in two treatment groups.
A deceptive manipulation was applied to both groups in which 
subjects were given a set of high test-anxious statements 
and informed that the statements represented the profile of 
an "average" college student's responses to the Test Anxiety 
Questionnaire. The first group. Attribution of Normality, 
Interpersonal Instructions, was then given the task instruc­
tions and reminded that anxiety was a normal reaction to
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test taking and not to worry about being anxious. The 
second group. Attribution of Normality, Self-Instructions, 
was instructed to employ this attribution of normality with­
in the self-instruction paradigm. Subjects were 
instructed to tell themselves that anxiety was a normal 
reaction to test taking and not to worry about being 
anxious when they noticed themselves becoming anxious in 
the analogue testing situations. These two groups were 
designed to assess the differential effects of interpersonal 
instructions concerning the attribution of normality com­
pared to the repeated exposure of this suggested reattri­
bution through self-instructions.
It was also hypothesized that self-instructions serve 
a distraction function. The literature in the areas of 
pain perception, delay of gratification and systematic 
desensitization suggest that self-instructions can be 
regarded as attention demanding thoughts that distract 
attention away from anxiety and therefore facilitate per­
formance. The distraction literature would suggest that 
employing any cognitive strategy (except an unpleasant 
cognitive transformation [Mischel, Ebbesen § Zeiss, 1972]) 
would be equally effective in attenuating anxiety. Hence 
a distraction group. Distraction, Pleasant Experience, was 
included to assess the effectiveness in alleviating test 
anxiety by instructing subjects to summarize a pleasant
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experience into a short phrase and silently verbalize that 
phrase when experiencing anxiety.
Finally, a control group, Standard Interpersonal 
Instructions, was included in order to assess the effects of 
repeated exposure to the test materials. This group was not 
provided with any instructions designed to help the sub­
jects cope with anxiety.
In summary, it was predicted that the treatment pro­
cedure which would have the greatest effects on all seven 
dependent measures would be the Attribution of Normality, 
Self-Instructions group. This group differed from the 
others because it offered 1) a self-perception change, 
suggesting that high test anxiety is a "normal" reaction, 
which was hypothesized to lower self-report measures of 
test anxiety and 2) a method by which to cope with anxiety 
in the testing situations (Self-Instruction Training).
The two other groups employing cognitive coping strategies, 
the Attention to Task, Self-Instructions group and the 
Distraction group, were expected to follow the Attribution 
of Normality, Self-Instructions group in effectiveness, but 
were not expected to differ from one another. These two 
groups were viewed as analogous in that they provided a 
means by which to distract the subject from his anxiety.
The least effective treatment group was predicted to be 
the Attribution of Normality, Interpersonal Instructions 
group because it offered only a self-perception change and
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no method by which to cope with the anxiety in the testing 
situation. However, all four treatment groups were pre­
dicted to be significantly greater in effectiveness as com­
pared to the Standard Interpersonal Instructions group.
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Chapter 3 
METHOD 
SUBJECTS
The subjects were drawn from 430 introductory 
psychology students who had completed Handler and Saranson's 
(1952) Test Anxiety Questionnaire (TAQ). The 75 subjects 
(18 males, 57 females) used had scored in the top 25% of 
the distribution, which was the operational definition of 
high test anxiety. The subjects were ranked ordered accord­
ing to their scores on the TAQ and 15 subjects were ran­
domly assigned according to a blocked design to each of the 
five groups. The following five groups were included in tlie 
study :
1) Attribution of Normality, Interpersonal 
Instructions
2) Attribution of Normality, Self-Instructions
3) Attention to Task, Self-Instructions
4) Distraction, Pleasant Experience
5) Standard Interpersonal Instructions
38
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DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Assessment of treatment effectiveness was determined 
by the administration of pre- and post - treatment self- 
report and performance measures. Three self-report 
measures of test anxiety were employed. The first, Handler 
and Saranson's (1952) Test Anxiety Questionnaire, a 37-item 
survey, was used to select subjects as well as to assess 
treatment effectiveness. Alper and Haber's (1960) 
Achievement Anxiety Test (AAT), a 19-Likert-type-item scale 
composed of two subscales--Facilitating Anxiety (AAT: FA) 
and Debilitating Anxiety (AAT: DA), was included to measure 
changes in self-report of debilitating and facilitating test 
anxiety. The Debilitating Anxiety subscale correlates .64 
with the Test Anxiety Questionnaire. The third paper and 
pencil inventory, the Liebert and Morris (1967) Worry and 
Emotionality Scale (W/E), a 10-item scale composed of a 
five-item Worry Scale (W/E: W) and a five-item Emotionality 
Scale (W/E: E), was included to measure these components as 
experienced immediately before a testing situation. The 
performance measures employed included alternate forms of 
the Digit Symbol Test (D.S.) by Brown (1969) and the 
Abstract Reasoning subtest (ABR) of the Differential Apti­
tude Test (DAT), forms L and M. Boor and Schell (1967) 
demonstrated that performance on digit symbol tasks is sig­
nificantly lowered by high levels of anxiety. The Abstract
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Reasoning subtest was included in an attempt to explore the 
use of a test longer than the Digit Symbol Test which 
could allow greater use of the cognitive coping strategies 
taught in the various treatment groups.
In addition to these dependent variables, the Check 
on Manipulations questionnaire was administered to subjects 
during the training sessions in order to ascertain the 
clarity of the instructions given and to determine if the 
cognitive strategies had been employed. Also at post­
assessment the Credibility Check was administered. This 
questionnaire was patterned after a set of questions con­
structed by Borkovec (1972) and was designed to determine 
the believability of the manipulations employed, primarily 
the instructions to use the cognitive strategies. One 
question was also included to assess if subjects believed 
that anxiety was a normal reaction to the taking of tests. 
Copies of all assessment measures (except the subtests of 
the DAT) can be found in the Appendix.
Pre-treatment assessment on the TAQ and AAT was con­
ducted five weeks prior to the commencement of the five 
treatment sessions. Pre-treatment assessment of the W/E 
and the two performance measures was conducted during the 
week before the treatment sessions began. Post-treatment 
assessment was conducted within the two weeks following 
the fifth treatment session except for four subjects who 
were tested four weeks following the fifth treatment
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session (two subjects in Group 3 and one subject each in 
groups 4 and 5).
PROCEDURE
The TAQ and AAT were administered to 430 students 
enrolled in an introductory psychology class. The top 25% 
on the TAQ were defined as high test anxious. A notice 
inviting these high test-anxious students to participate 
in an experiment that would fulfill all of their experi­
mental hour requirements plus enable them to earn additional 
experimental credits was posted. The experiment was 
described as a study assessing college students' performance 
on a variety of tasks. Subjects who responded to the 
notice were instructed to attend the first experimental 
meeting on one of two dates the following week.
At these first meetings, subjects were given "ego-
involving" instructions similar to those employed in
previous research (Meichenbaum, 1972). The following
instructions were given:
You will be taking two tests today. The first, 
an Abstract Reasoning Test; the second, a Digit 
Symbol Test. Both of these measures assess 
general intelligence and are highly correlated 
with academic success in college.
The subjects were then asked to fill out the W/E scale prior 
to taking the two tests. Immediately following this sur­
vey, the Abstract Reasoning and Digit Symbol Test were 
administered.
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Seventy-five subjects completed the first assessment 
session and agreed to participate in the remainder of the 
study. These subjects were blocked according to their 
scores on the TAQ and then were randomly assigned to the 
five groups.
Subjects met in their respective groups and partici­
pated in five one-hour training sessions. The tasks 
administered during the five training sessions were iden­
tical for each group. The subjects were given "ego- 
involving” instructions prior to the administration of the 
tests each session. In addition, prior to the test adminis 
tration during session three, subjects were informed that 
as a whole this group was doing more poorly than typical 
college students elsewhere in order to increase anxiety. 
This was done because self-report measures (W/E) from the 
previous session had shown that the subjects were experi­
encing low levels of anxiety. All subjects completed the 
following tests and scales in the order presented:
1) Worry and Emotionality Scale
2) Subtest Differential Aptitude Test
Verbal Reasoning, form L 
Numerical Reasoning, form L 
Mechanical Reasoning, form L 
Space Relations, form L 
Verbal Reasoning, form M
a) Session 1 DAT:
b) Session 2 DAT:
c ) Session 3 DAT:
d ) Sess ion 4 DAT:
e ) Session 5 DAT:
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3) Digit Symbol Test (alternate forms)
4) Check on Manipulations
Additional instructions presented to subjects were 
different for each group. The instructions for group 1, 
Attribution of Normality, Interpersonal Instructions, and 
group 2, Attribution of Normality, Self-Instructions, 
included an attribution of normality manipulation. The 
subjects in group 2, Attribution of Normality, Self- 
Instructions, group 3, Attention to Task, Self-Instructions, 
and group 4, Distraction, Pleasant Experience, were 
instructed to employ cognitive coping strategies.
ATTRIBUTION OF NORMALITY MANIPULATION
At the beginning of session one, the subjects in 
groups 1 and 2 were given a profile of an "average" college 
student's responses to the Test Anxiety Questionnaire that 
they took in their psychology class (see Appendix A ) .
This profile of statements contained a series of high test- 
anxious responses. The subjects were asked to read these 
statements silently. During the remaining sessions, sub­
jects were reminded that test anxiety was a normal reaction 
to the taking of tests and so not to worry about it.
COGNITIVE COPING STRATEGIES
Following the "ego-involving" instructions and prior 
to the test administrations, subjects in groups 2, 3 and 4
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were instructed to employ a cognitive coping strategy each 
time they noticed themselves becoming anxious while taking 
the tests. The subjects in group 2, Attribution of Nor­
mality, Self-Instructions, were given the following 
instructions regarding the cognitive strategy:
During the test taking when you notice yourself 
becoming anxious, simply remind yourself that 
anxiety is a normal reaction to test taking.
That is, silently say to yourself that anxiety 
is a normal reaction to test taking and so not 
to worry about being anxious.
The subjects in group 3, Attention to Task, Self-Instructions,
were given these instructions regarding the cognitive
strategy :
During the test taking when you notice yourself 
becoming anxious, simply tell yourself to stop 
being anxious and to attend to the task at hand.
That is, silently say to yourself to pay atten­
tion to the task you are working on.
The subjects in group 4, Distraction, Pleasant Experience, 
were given the following instructions regarding the cogni­
tive strategy:
During the test taking when you notice yourself 
becoming anxious, simply summarize a pleasant 
personal experience into a short phrase and 
silently verbalize this phrase to yourself.
The subjects in group 5 did not receive any instruc­
tions in addition to those common to the other four groups.
Within two weeks after training session five, all 
subjects (except four who were tested four weeks after the 
final treatment session) were administered the post-test
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assessment measures. All subjects completed the Test 
Anxiety Questionnaire, the Achievement Anxiety Test, the 
Worry and Emotionality Scale, the Abstract Reasoning Test 
(alternate form), the Digit Symbol Test (alternate form) 
and the Credibility Check.
During the final assessment session, subjects were 
debriefed as to the deceptions employed in the study and 
asked not to discuss the experiment with anyone until the 
following quarter.
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Chapter 4 
RESULTS 
SUBJECTS
A total of 75 subjects were rank ordered according 
to their scores on the Test Anxiety Questionnaire and then 
were assigned to each of the five groups in a blocked 
design, IS subjects per group. Twelve subjects failed to 
complete all sessions of the study and were dropped from 
the analysis. Fourteen subjects completed the experiment 
in group 1, Attribution of Normality, Interpersonal 
Instructions (2 males and 12 females), and group 5, Standard 
Interpersonal Instructions (1 male and 13 females).
Group 2, Attribution of Normality, Self-Instructions, and 
group 3, Attention to Task, Self-Instruct ions, both con­
tained 12 subjects (1 male and 11 females). Eleven sub­
jects in group 4, Distraction, Pleasant Experience [7 males 
and 4 females), completed the experiment.
A 1 X 3 analysis of variance was performed on each of 
the five post-session self-report ratings assessing the use 
of the cognitive strategies by subjects in groups 2, 3 and 
4 (Check on Manipulations). No differences between the use
46
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of cognitive strategies were found. The largest F value 
was 1,593, p 20; the other four F values were less than 
one. Average use of the cognitive strategies per session 
ranged between 2.11 and 2.94, indicating that subjects 
employed the strategies less than "sometimes'' when experi­
encing anxiety.
A 1 X 3 analysis of variance, performed for each item 
of the post - treatment Credibility Check assessing the 
believability of the cognitive strategies, revealed no sig- 
nigicant differences between the groups. The largest F 
value was 1.465, p .20. Thus, all groups employing the 
cognitive strategies found them to be equally credible 
procedures. A 1 x 5 analysis of variance, performed on 
the question assessing the normality of test anxiety, 
revealed that the subjects in all groups were equally as 
likely to believe that test anxiety was normal. The F value 
was 0.57, p .20.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Test Anxiety Questionnaire
A 5 X 2 (Groups x TAQ) analysis for repeated measures 
was performed on the TAQ scores. A summary of the results 
of this analysis is presented in Table 2. Due to the 
violation of the assumption of homogeneity, subjects were 
discarded to produce equal sample size (n = 11) for the 
analysis. A significant difference was obtained from
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pre-test to post-test (F = 13.850, ^  = 1/50, p .01), indi­
cating that test anxiety scores did decrease following the 
five training sessions. However, the nonsignificant F 
ratio obtained for the AB interaction indicated that 
decreases occurred in all five of the experimental condi­
tions. Newman Keuls analysis revealed no significant dif­
ferences between groups at pre-treatment and no signifi­
cant differences at post-treatment.
Achievement Anxiety Test:
Debilitating Anxiety
A 5 X 2 ANOVA for repeated measures using equal sample 
size was performed on the Debilitating Anxiety scores. The 
results of this analysis are presented in summary Table 3.
A significant decrease in Debilitating Anxiety scores was 
not found. Newman Keuls analysis revealed that none of 
the groups differed at pro-treatment on their Debilitating 
Anxiety scores nor were there group differences at post­
assessment .
Achievement Anxiety Test :
Facilitating Anxiety
A summary of the results of the 5 x 2  ANOVA for 
repeated measures using equal n's for Facilitating Anxiety 
is presented in Table 4. A significant change in Facili­
tating Anxiety scores following the experimental manipula­
tions was not found. Multiple comparisons of the groups 
at pre- and post - treatment using the Newman Keuls revealed
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that group 2, Attribution of Normality, Self-Instructions, 
and group 5, Standard Interpersonal Instructions, were 
significantly different from one another at pre-treatment. 
(Subjects in group 2 reported more facilitating anxiety 
than subjects in group 5.) The remaining groups did not 
differ from 2 and 5 nor from one another. At the post­
assessment there was no difference between groups 2 and 5 
and the Facilitating Anxiety scores for all of the groups 
were equivalent.
Worry and Emotionality 
Scale : Worry
The results of the 5 x 2  ANOVA performed on the Worry 
Scale are summarized in Table 5. A statistically signifi­
cant F ratio was obtained from pre-test to post-test 
(F = 59.447, ^  = 1/58, p .01), indicating that scores 
on the Worry Scale did decrease following the experimental 
manipulations. A nonsignificant F ratio obtained for the 
AB interaction reveals that this decrease in Worry scores 
did not differ between groups. Newman Keuls analysis of 
the group means at pre-treatment revealed that group 2 was 
significantly greater than groups 1 and 4, but did not 
differ from the remaining groups. At post-treatment 
assessment group 2 was significantly greater than groups 3 
and 5 and again did not differ from the remaining groups. 
That is, with the exception of group 2, all groups were 
equivalent to one another at pre- and post-assessment.
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Worry and Emotionality 
Scale: Emotionality
The results of the 5 x 2  ANOVA performed on the 
Emotionality Scale are depicted in Table 6. A significant 
F ratio was obtained from pre- to post-test (F = 18.294, 
df = 1/58, p .01), revealing a significant decrease on 
the Emotionality scores after the experimental manipula­
tions. The nonsignificant F ratio obtained for the AB 
interaction revealed that this decrease was not different 
for all groups. Multiple comparisons of the means at pre­
test using the Newman Keuls test revealed no significant 
difference at pre-test. Newman Keuls analysis at post-test 
also revealed no significant differences between the post­
treatment means.
Abstract Reasoning Test
A summary of the 5 x 2  ANOVA performed on the Abstract 
Reasoning Test is presented in Table 7. A significant F 
ratio was obtained from pre-test to post-test (F = 8.452, 
df = 1/58, p .01), indicating that scores on the Abstract 
Reasoning Test improved after the experimental manipulations 
were implemented. The nonsignificant AB interaction 
reflects that this improvement was not different for all 
groups. Newman Keuls analysis of the Abstract Reasoning 
Test group means revealed that none of the groups differed 
from one another at pre-test and none of the means differed 
at post-test.
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Digit Symbol Test
The results of the 5 x 2  ANOVA performed on the Digit 
Symbol Test are summarized in Table 8. A significant F 
ratio was obtained from pre-test to post-test (F = 31.903, 
df = 1/58, p .01), indicating an increase in performance 
on the Digit Symbol Test following the five training 
sessions. The nonsignificant AB interaction reflects that 
this improvement was not different for any of the groups. 
Newman Keuls analysis of the Digit Symbol Test revealed no 
significant differences between groups at the pre­
assessment nor were differences found at the post­
assessment .
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T a b le  1
Group Means of Pre- and Post- Treatment Scores
Pre- Post- Pre- Post-
Group Group
TAQ 1 2 5 .7 1 4 3 23.5000 AAT: 1 32.4545 33.1818
2 2 6 .3 3 3 20 .833 3 DA 2 33.4545 31.5455
3 26 .2 5 0 0 22 .416 7 3 3 1 .7 2 7 3 31.7273
4 25.9091 23.4545 4 3 4 .7 2 7 3 30.1818
5 25.8571 23 .7857 5 30.1818 31.0000
AAT: 1 22 .000 0 22 .454 5 W/E: 1 1 1 .4 2 8 6 8 .5 0 0 0
FA 2 2 3 .0 0 0 0 21.5455 W 2 1 4 .6 6 6 7 11.4167
3 21 .6 3 6 4 22.4545 3 13.2500 8.0000
4 2 2 .363 6 22 .000 0 4 11.4545 9.6363
5 18 .9 0 9 0 22.6364 5 13.2857 8.2143
W/E: 1 8 .7 8 5 7 7.2143 ABR 1 39.5714 4 1 .7 1 4 3
E 2 10.4167 8 .0 8 3 3 2 39 .166 7 3 9 .3 3 3 3
3 7 .6667 5 .7 5 0 0 3 41.7500 4 2 .5 8 3 3
4 7 .9091 6.4546 4 40.0909 43.6364
5 8 .6 4 2 9 6 .9 2 8 6 5 3 9 .3571 4 3 .2 8 5 7
D.S. 1 67.0000 73 .5000
2 70 .250 0 76 .4167
3 6 2 .0 8 3 3 71.7500
4 64.4545 73.1818
5 63.7143 70.1429
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T a b le  2
Summary o f  A n a ly s is  o f  V a r ia n c e  f o r
Test  A n x ie t y  Q u e s t io n n a i r e
Source SS df MS F
Between Subjects 
Experimental conditions (A) 7.4000 4 1.8500 0.050
Subj. W. Groups 1862.820 50 37.2564
Within Subjects 
Trials (Bj 201.827 1 201.827 **13.850
AB 11.0364 4 2.7591 0.189
B. X Subj. W. Groups 728.636 50 14.5727
Total 2811.7294 109
A * p .01
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T a b le  3
Summary o f  A n a ly s is  o f  V a r ia n c e  f o r  Achievement
A n x ie ty  T e s t :  D e b i l i t a t i n g  A n x ie ty
Source SS df MS F
Between Subjects
Experimental conditions (A) 70.0545 4 17.5136 0.339
Subj. W. Groups 2581.91 50 51.6382
Within Subjects
Trials (B) 26.5091 1 26.5091 1.010
AB 113.764 4 28.4409 1.084
B. X Subj . VA Groups 1311.73 50 26.2345
Total 4103.9676 109
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T a b le  4
Summary o f  A n a ly s is  o f  V a r ia n c e  f o r  Achievement
A n x ie ty  T e s t :  F a c i l i t a t i n g  A n x ie ty
Source SS d f MS F
Between Subjects
Experimental conditions (A) 35 .581 8 4 8 .8 9 5 5 0 .2 1 3
Subj. W, Groups 2088 .8 2 50 41.7764
Within Subjects
Trials 11.1364 1 11.1364 0 .5 1 8 3
AB 82 .4545 4 20 .6136 0 .9 6 0
B. X Subj. W. Groups 1073.91 50 21 .478 2
Total 3291 .9037 109
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T a b le  5
Summary of Analysis of Variance for Worry and 
Emotionality Scale: Worry
Source SS df MS F
Between Subjects
Experimental conditions (A) 139 .462 4 34 .8655 1 .3 0 5
Subj. W. Groups 1549.25 58 26 .7112
Within Subjects
Trials 434.571 1 434.571 5 9 .4 4 7 * *
AB 52.4318 4 13 .108 0 1 .7 9 3
B. X Subj. W. Groups 423 .99 7 58 7 .3 1 0 3
Total 2599 .7118 125
p .01
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
57
T a b le  6
Summary of Analysis of Variance for Worry and 
Emotionality Scale: Emotionality
Source SS df MS F
Between Subjects
Experimental conditions (A) 88.5943 4 22.1486 1.201
Subj. W. Groups 1069.95 58 18.4473
Within Subjects
Trials 101.341 1 101.341 18.294**
AB 2.8606 4 0.7151 0.129
B. X Subj. W. Groups 321.298 58 5.5396
Total 1584.0439 125
**p .01
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T a b le  7
Summary o f  A n a ly s is  o f  V a r ia n c e  f o r
A b s t r a c t  Reasoning Test
Source SS df MS F
Between Subjects
Experimental conditions (A) 1 28 .9 1 3 4 3 2 .2 2 8 3 1.102
Subj. W. Groups 1695 .9 6 58 29.2407
Within Subjects
Trials (Bj 146.794 1 146.794 8.452**
AB 6 6 .8 5 4 6 4 16 .7 1 3 7 0 .9 6 2
B. X Subj. W. Groups 1007.35 58 17.3681
Total 345.8716 125
**p .01
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T a b le  8
Summary o f  A n a ly s is  o f  V a r ia n c e  f o r
D i g i t  Symbol T e s t
Source SS df MS F
Between Subjects
Experimental conditions (A) 713.668 4 178.417 1.146
Subj. W, Groups 9026.04 58 155.621
Within Subjects
Trials (B) 1730.87 1 1730.87 31.903**
AB 61.9130 4 15.4783 0.285
B. X Subj. W, Groups 3146.72 58 54.2538
Total 14679.2110 125
.01
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 5 
DISCUSSION
The major hypotheses of the present study were not 
confirmed. Scores on the Test Anxiety Questionnaire (TAQ) 
and Worry and Emotionality Scale decreased from pre- to 
post - treatment for subjects in the four treatment groups 
(groups 1-4). A significant increase in performance by 
these groups on the Abstract Reasoning Test and the Digit 
Symbol Test was also found at post - assessment. However, 
all treatment groups were also equivalent to the control 
group, suggesting that simply repeated exposure to the 
anxiety-arousing materials could have accounted for the 
decreases in anxiety and increases in performance. The 
nonsignificant results for the Achievement Anxiety Test on 
both the Debilitating and Facilitating scales indicate 
that neither repeated exposure to the anxiety-arousing 
materials nor any of the cognitive strategies influenced how 
the subjects construed their anxiety as measured by these 
subscales. The failure of the experimental manipulations 
to have any impact on the self-report or performance 
measures of test anxiety necessitates scrutiny of the 
methodology employed in the present study.
60
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One might argue that the test anxiety levels of the 
subjects employed in the present study were not sufficiently 
high to be successfully influenced by the manipulations. 
Subjects were drawn from a population of students enrolled 
in an Introductory psychology class where participation in 
experiments was required. They were selected on the basis 
of their scores on a self-report measure, the TAQ, and were 
labeled as test anxious if their scores fell within the 
top 25% of the class. In the studies by Meichenbaum (1972) 
and Wine (1971a), subjects were recruited via an advertise­
ment for a treatment designed to help alleviate test 
anxiety, thus attempting to reduce the gap between analogue 
and clinical research. In addition, the subjects in Wine's 
study had to meet predetermined cut-off scores on the self- 
report measures. Subjects falling below these criteria were 
not used. Despite this major difference in the procedure 
for subject selection, a comparison of the mean pre­
treatment scores on the self-report scales employed in the 
present investigation with those used in Meichenbaum's and 
Wine's research revealed that all subjects were very similar 
on their self-reports of test anxiety. The mean pre­
treatment scores on the Debilitating Anxiety Scale for the 
present investigation was 32.51 as compared to 34.63 in 
Meichenbaum's study and 35.38 in Wine's investigation.
The mean pre-treatment scores on the Facilitating Anxiety 
Scale were respectively 21.40, 19.12 and 21.58. (Mean
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scores for the TAQ could not be compared. Meichenbaum did 
not use the TAQ in his study, while Wine employed a 
shortened version of the TAQ, the Test Anxiety Schedule.) 
The only difference noted was on the Digit Symbol Test. 
Although not a measure of test anxiety, digit symbol tests 
have been shown to be negatively correlated with measures 
of anxiety. The mean pre-treatment score for the present 
study was 65.50 as compared to 54.73 in Meichenbaum's 
investigation and 52.41 in Wine's research.
Given that the subjects selected were comparable to 
test-anxious subjects in past research, it is necessary to 
determine if sufficient anxiety was generated during the 
five treatment sessions and at the post-treatment assess­
ment period. The purpose of the practice sessions for 
groups 2-4 was to provide subjects with an opportunity to 
learn to cope with anxiety by using the cognitive strate­
gies. If no anxiety was generated by the ego - involving 
instructions and the experimental tasks, this learning 
could not take place. Similarly, it was important that at 
post-treatment anxiety be generated in order that the 
cognitive strategies be employed. The ego-involving instruc 
tions used in this study were patterned after Meichenbaum 
and the tasks used were similar to those employed by Wine. 
However, as was noted in the Methods Chapter, responses on 
the Worry and Emotionality Scale revealed that by session 
two subjects were no longer experiencing anxiety when
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confronted with the experimental tasks. Although self- 
reported anxiety was raised by the experimenter informing 
the subjects that they as a whole were doing more poorly 
than other students had done in the past, the effectiveness 
in arousing anxiety to a significant level during the 
experimental sessions must be questioned. Since all of 
the sessions, including post-assessment, were conducted by 
one experimenter, subjects may have become accustomed to 
the investigator and habituated to the impact of the ego- 
involving instructions and the test administration. 
Meichenbaum employed different experimenters to administer 
pre- and post-assessment hence eliminating the habituation 
to experimenter problem, while Wine was the sole experi­
menter in her study. A direct comparison of the present 
investigation with the studies by Wine and Meichenbaum can­
not be made because neither investigation employed a com­
parable check to determine if anxiety was aroused during 
the treatment phase.
One important difference between the present work and 
the studies by Meichenbaum and Wine is that the latter 
were described as treatments for test anxiety, while the 
former was billed as an experiment investigating student 
performance on a variety of tasks. It is conceivable that 
this differing set made all of the experimental manipulations 
less credible and consequently less effective when viewed 
in the context of an experiment. Although the Credibility
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Check administered at the post-assessment period revealed 
that subjects viewed all three cognitive strategies as 
equally credible procedures which might be helpful to 
individuals who experienced anxiety when taking tests, this 
information does not reveal if these procedures would have 
been more believable had they been introduced as a treat­
ment for test anxiety.
In the present investigation, group 3, Attention to 
Task, Self-Instructions, was patterned after the Atten- 
tional Training group in Wine's study. This treatment 
group contained the element deemed as most crucial--the 
rehearsal of the cognitive self-statements to attend to the 
task while actually engaged in test-taking behavior. It 
is conceivable that the treatment rationale provided by 
Wine--that test-anxious individuals perform poorly on tests 
because they do not focus their full attention on the task 
at hand but rather engage in self-evaluative worrying-- 
made the use of the cognitive strategy seem more reason­
able than the experimental instructions which simply 
informed the subjects that this cognitive strategy would 
help them to perform better.
The results of the present investigation could also 
suggest that Wine's conclusion that the rehearsal of the 
cognitive strategy was the treatment component responsible 
for change is in error. This element was isolated in the 
present study and it produced no measurable effects beyond
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the effects of repeated exposure to the tasks. It is 
therefore possible that the other components in Wine's 
treatment package--videotaped models employing the cogni­
tive strategy in testing situations and group discussions 
in which subjects explored the negative self-statements 
that they employ while taking tests and thinking about 
tests--may have been the causal agents.
The believability of the attribution of normality 
manipulation used in the present study must also be 
addressed. Subjects in this study, aware that they were in 
an experiment, may have discounted the information provided 
to them regarding the normality of anxiety reactions to 
tests. The same one-page sheet describing the "typical" 
college student may have proved to be a compelling document 
if given to subjects under the guise of treatment. It is 
also possible that this manipulation was too blatant, the 
one-page description too obviously "rigged," causing the 
manipulation to be ineffective. It should be noted that 
although neither researcher was deliberately trying to 
manipulate normality, the group discussion employed in the 
work by Meichenbaum and Wine contained a subtle manipula­
tion of normality. That is, during the group meetings, 
participants were encouraged to talk about their thoughts 
and feelings toward test taking. Subjects learned that 
their reactions were not unique; they came to view their 
reactions as very common (normal). Perhaps a more subtle
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manipulation of normality would have proved more effective 
in the present work.
It can also be argued that the attribution of nor­
mality was a component of all five groups and that this 
factor accounted for the uniform decreases in anxiety and 
increases in performance. The instructions for the use of 
the cognitive strategies in groups 2-4 began, "If you 
notice yourself becoming anxious, . . . "  suggesting that 
this was a common reaction. Also, all five groups filled 
out the Worry and Emotionality Scale at the end of each 
session, again emphasizing that all subjects should be 
experiencing some anxiety. Support for this contention can 
be derived from the post - treatment Credibility Check which 
revealed that all subjects were equally as likely to regard 
anxiety as a normal reaction to test taking. However, 
because this question was only assessed at post - treatment, 
subject endorsement of this belief cannot be unequivocably 
attributed to having participated in the experiment. It is 
equally as likely that the subjects viewed anxiety as a 
normal reaction to test taking prior to their participation 
in this study. If the latter is true, then the attribu­
tion of normality was something obvious to all and unneces­
sary to state. This would suggest that the effectiveness 
of the cognitive manipulation of normality is dependent 
upon subjects having a previous perception that their 
reactions are abnormal.
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The distraction manipulation used in group 4, in 
which subjects were instructed to summarize a pleasant 
experience into a short phrase and to say this phrase to 
themselves when confronting anxiety, may, like the other 
cognitive strategies, have suffered from a lack of 
believability. Wine did not have a comparable condition 
to group 4 in her study, nor did she employ a no-treatment 
control group. The group to which she compared the 
Attentional Training and Attentional Training plus 
Relaxation groups was the antithesis of the distraction 
group used in this study. That is, in Wine’s third 
experimental condition, subjects were instructed to focus 
on their anxiety reactions and negative self-statements 
when working on the tasks during the practice sessions.
This Self-Attending group was shown to be less effective 
than the Attentional Training groups and Wine concluded 
that the attention to task self-instructions was the crucial 
change agent. However, the question of whether the atten­
tion to task self-instructions is effective because it 
directs attention to the task or away from anxiety remains 
to be addressed.
Finally, the treatment versus experimental focus 
which has been explored in the above paragraphs may also 
alter the "set" by which subjects fill out self-report 
measures. Mischel (1968) addresses the often ignored point 
that objective tests--despite their standardization.
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reproducibility and test-retest reliability--are highly 
subjective. Individuals administered a self-report inven­
tory are asked to . . extrapolate extensively from 
behavior, to go far beyond direct behavior observation, 
and to supply subjective inferences about the psychological 
meaning of behavior" (p. 60). It can be argued that sub­
jects in the present study when taking the self-report 
measures initially construed the items in terms of their 
anxiety to tests in general. Following the five experi­
mental sessions their answers may have been viewed in terms 
of the tests taken during the practice sessions. In the 
studies by Wine and Meichenbaum due to the treatment 
focus the test anxiety questions may have been construed 
within the larger context at both administrations.
The results derived from the self-report measures 
of anxiety present one additional problem which necessi­
tates comment. As was stated in the first paragraph of 
this chapter, subjects' scores on the Test Anxiety Question­
naire decreased from pre- to post-assessment, whereas the 
Debilitating and Facilitating Anxiety subscales did not 
change. This is a curious finding due to .64 correlation 
between the TAQ and the Debilitating Anxiety Scale. The 
test-retest reliabilities for these two measures are .91 
(Handler d, Cowen, 1958) and .87 (Alpert § Haber, 1960) 
respectively. These scores reveal that both scales are 
equally reliable measures of test anxiety and suggest either
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that participation in this study differentially affected 
subject responses to these scales or that the present 
results represent a chance fluctuation which is spurious.
Future work should be directed toward ascertaining 
the contributions of the various components of Self- 
Instruction Training programs. The treatment components in 
the self-instruction package employed by Wine included the 
use of videotaped models, a discussion group in which 
common concerns about tests were explored plus the rehearsal 
of the self-instructions in a testing situation. Although 
Wine emphasized the importance of the self-instruction 
component, the other components merit experimental investi­
gation as well. More specifically, the significance of 
the group discussion with particular emphasis upon the 
attribution of normality within this discussion should be 
explored. It will be important to ascertain if the nor­
mality manipulation is only effective when subjects, prior 
to treatment, view their behavior as abnormal. Further 
exploration of the importance of the content of self­
statements employed and the rationale provided for the use 
of the cognitive strategy should be conducted. A question 
addressed but not answered in this study--do self- 
instructions simply serve as distractors away from anxiety-- 
remains to be investigated.
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Chapter 6 
SUMMARY
The present study incorporated research from three 
diverse areas of experimental investigation: I) the
clinical implications of attribution and self-perception 
theories, 2) Self-Instruction Training and its applicability 
to the alleviation of test anxiety and 3) distraction as 
employed in pain attenuation work, delay of gratification 
and in systematic desensitization. The primary purpose 
of this investigation was to extend the work of Meichenbaum 
(1972) and Wine (1971a, 1971b) in the area of test anxiety 
and to explore in greater detail Meichenbaum's theoretical 
rationale for the efficacy of the Self-Instruction Training 
procedure.
Three components of Wine’s (1971a) treatment package 
were isolated and the efficacy of these elements in allevi­
ating test anxiety in college students was assessed. The 
first component deemed by Wine to be the crucial element of 
change was the rehearsal of self-instructions to attend to 
the task by the subjects when experiencing anxiety in 
testing situations. The second component was the "attri­
bution of normality" postulated by the present author to be
70
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
71
an essential feature of the group discussions in Wine’s 
study and a potential agent of change. The third isolated 
component was the distraction function of the self- 
instructions. It was hypothesized that the self- 
instructions were attention-demanding thoughts which dis­
tract the person away from his anxiety, thus allowing him 
to focus on the test questions.
High test-anxious undergraduates, selected on the 
basis of their scores on Handler and Sarason's (1952) Test 
Anxiety Questionnaire, were assigned to one of the follow­
ing five groups:
1) Attribution of Normality, Interpersonal 
Instructions
2) Attribution of Normality, Self-Instructions
3) Attention to Task, Self-Instructions
4) Distraction, Pleasant Experience
5) Standard Interpersonal Instructions
All subjects participated in five one-hour training 
sessions during which they were administered a series of 
subtests from the Differential Aptitude Test (DAT). The 
subjects were given "ego-involving" instructions concerning 
these tasks which were designed to engender anxiety in the 
subj ects.
Additional instructions presented to subjects were 
different for each group. The subjects in groups 1 and 2 
were exposed to an "attribution of normality" manipulation.
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Subjects were provided with a written statement which con­
tained a series of high test-anxious responses and were 
informed that this represented the "average" college 
student. The subjects in groups 2, 3 and 4 were instructed 
to employ cognitive strategics each time they noticed them­
selves becoming anxious while taking the DAT subtests.
The subjects in group 2 were instructed to covertly 
verbalize the statement that anxiety is a normal reaction 
to test taking. The cognitive strategy for group 3 was the 
attention-to-task self-instruction as used by Wine. And 
in group 4, subjects were instructed to summarize a pleasant 
personal experience into a short phrase and to verbalize 
this phrase covertly. Finally, the subjects in group 5 
did not receive any instructions in addition to those 
common to the other four groups.
Assessment of treatment effectiveness was determined 
by the administration of pre- and post-treatment self- 
report measures. The three self-report measures employed 
were the 1) Test Anxiety Questionnaire, 2) Achievement 
Anxiety Test (Alpert  ̂ Haber, 1960) and 3) Worry and 
Emotionality Scale (Liebert S Morris, 1967). The performance 
measures used were alternative forms of Brown's (1969)
Digit Symbol Test and alternate forms of the Abstract 
Reasoning Test from the DAT.
It was predicted that all treatment groups (groups 1-4) 
would be more effective in alleviating test anxiety than
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the control group (group 5). In addition, it was predicted 
that the most effective treatment procedure would be 
group 2, Attribution of Normality, Self-Instructions. The 
other two groups employing cognitive strategies, groups 3, 
Attention to Task, Self-Instructions, and group 4, Dis­
traction, Pleasant Experience, were predicted to be equal 
to one another in effectiveness and group 1, Attribution of 
Normality, Interpersonal Instructions, least effective.
None of the hypotheses of the study was confirmed.
The results revealed that none of the groups differed from 
one another at post-test on any of the dependent measures.
A significant decrease in self-reported test anxiety and 
increases in performance were found for all groups.
The failure of the experimental manipulations to 
have any impact on the dependent measures was discussed in 
terms of the methodology employed. The adequacy of the 
selection procedure for obtaining highly test-anxious 
subjects was evaluated and found to be acceptable. The 
procedures employed to engender anxiety during the training 
sessions were viewed as inadequate. The believability of 
the attribution manipulation and the use of the cognitive 
strategies was addressed. It was suggested that the experi­
ment may have lacked credibility because the study was 
described as an experiment rather than a treatment. It was 
furthermore argued that the attribution of normality may
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have been a component of all five treatment groups or sub­
jects may have believed that test anxiety was normal prior 
to the commencement of the training sessions. It was 
postulated that the attribution of normality manipulation 
may only be effective when subjects believe prior to treat­
ment that their responses are abnormal. Finally, it was 
suggested that future research be directed toward ascer­
taining the contributions of the various components of 
Self-Instruction Training programs.
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APPENDIX A 
ATTRIBUTION OF NORMALITY STATEMENT
The typical student at the University of Montana is 
very concerned about his performance in college, especially 
on tests. While taking tests he often finds that he is 
continually comparing himself with others, thinking that 
they are much brighter than he. He is convinced that he 
is doing poorly on the exam. Furthermore, while taking 
tests the typical student thinks about the grade he will 
receive on tlie test and often begins to ask himself if he 
will ever make it through college. Then he begins to 
think of the consequences of failing--what will happen if 
he blows this test, what will happen if he flunks out of 
college? He often forgets facts that he has studied and 
knows when he is in the testing situation and freezes up. 
Physiologically, the typical college student notices his 
heart beating very fast while taking an important exam and 
finds that his hands and arms tremble. Often, the student 
finds that he doesn't enjoy eating right before an important 
exam and sometimes will have an upset stomach after an exam 
or feel somewhat depressed. One of the things that the 
typical student dreads most are pop quizzes. The usual 
reaction is panic. Time limits are also viewed as
82
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increasing the pressures on the student while taking an 
exam. Finally, most students feel that the University 
ought to recognize that students are nervous about tests 
and that this affects their performance. In summary, 
studios nationwide at other universities have confirmed 
these results, suggesting that Montana students are quite 
similar to all college students concerning their attitudes 
about and reactions to tests.
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APPENDIX B
TEST ANXIETY QUESTIONNAIRE
DIRECTIONS : This survey contains a list of statements
concerning attitudes and feelings about tests. Read each 
statement and indicate whether you believe that it is true 
or false by filling in the appropriate place on the answer 
sheet. If the statement is true fill in the first space 
next to the number of the item; if the statement is false, 
mark the second space. It is most important that you 
carefully and honestly answer each item. Please do not 
leave any item blank, as then the test cannot be scored.
T 1. I seem to defeat myself while working on important
tests.
T 2. While taking an important exam I find myself
thinking of how much brighter the other students 
are than I am.
T 3. The harder I work at taking a test, or studying
for one, the more confused I get.
T 4. As soon as an exam is over I try to stop worrying
about it, but I just can't.
T 5. If I were to take an intelligence test I would
worry a great deal before taking it.
T 6. During exams I sometimes wonder if I'll ever get
through college.
T 7. I would rather write a paper than take an examina­
tion for my grade in a course.
T 8. I wish examinations did not bother me so much.
T 9. I think I could do much better on tests if I could
take them alone and not feel pressured by a time 
limit.
T 10. Thinking about the grade I may get in a course
interferes with my studying and my performance on 
tests.
84
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T 11. I£ examinations could be done away with I think
I would actually learn more.
F 12, On exams, I take the attitude, "If I don't know
it now, there's no point worrying about it."
F 13. If I knew I was going to take an intelligence test,
I would feel confident and relaxed beforehand.
F 14. I really don't see why some people get so upset
about tests.
T 15. Thoughts of doing poorly interfere with my perfor­
mance on tests.
F 16. I don't study any harder for final exams than for
the rest of my course work.
T 17. Even when I'm well prepared for a test, I feel very
anxious about it.
T 18. I don't enjoy eating before an important test.
T 19. While taking an important examination, I perspire 
a great deal.
T 20. Before an important examination I find my hands or 
arms trembling.
T 21. During course examinations, I find myself thinking 
of things unrelated to the actual course material.
F 22. I seldom feel the need for "cramming" before an 
exam.
I 23. The University ought to recognize that some students
are more nervous than others about tests and that 
this affects their performance.
T 24. I get to feel very panicky when I have to take a 
surprise exam.
T 25. During tests, I find myself thinking of the conse­
quences of failing.
T 26. It seems to me that examination periods ought not 
to be made the tense situations which they are.
T 27. After important tests I am frequently so tense that 
my stomach gets upset.
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T 28. I start feeling very uneasy just before getting a 
test paper back.
T 29. I dread courses where the professor has the habit 
of giving "pop" quizzes.
T 30. I freeze up on things like intelligence tests and 
final exams.
T 31. Getting a good grade on one test doesn't seem to 
increase my confidence on the second.
T 32. I sometimes feel my heart beating very fast during
important tests.
T 33. After taking a test I always feel I could have done 
better than I actually did.
T 34. I usually get depressed after taking a test.
T 35. I have an uneasy, upset feeling before taking a
final examination.
F 36. When taking a test, my emotional feelings do not 
interfere with my performance.
T 37. During a course examination, I frequently get so 
nervous that I forget facts I really know.
(A respondent will score one point for each item marked as 
indicated, T (true) and F (false). The maximum score on the 
TAQ is 37.)
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APPENDIX C
ACHIEVEMENT ANXIETY TEST
Directions : This scale deals with your feelings about a
variety of scholastic situations. Read each statement and 
decide to what extent it applies to you. Circle the number 
in the appropriate column under the heading which best 
describes the frequency you experience the feeling described 
by the statements. Do not ponder the questions; work as 
rapidly as possible since your first impression is usually 
accurate. Answer every item.
onnp(/IH-p 3 o p p3 P 3 o t—' h-‘<D 3 M P t-h s: 3< O O t—‘ r+ P o
CD W »-* CD X  W
M  r+ % X 3 VI r+
1 2 3 4 5D 1. Nervousness while taking an
exam or test hinders me from 
doing well.
F 2 . 1  work most effectively 1 2  3 4 5
under pressure, as when the 
task is very important.
D 3. In a course where I have 1 2  3 4 5
been doing poorly my fear 
of a bad grade cuts down on 
my efficiency.
4. I have a good appetite. 1 2  3 4 5
D 5. When I am poorly prepared 1 2  3 4 5
for an exam or test, I get 
upset, and do less well than 
even my restricted knowledge 
should allow.
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D 6. The more important the exam­
ination, the less well I seem 
to do.
7. I spend more than ten 
minutes a day reading the 
newspaper.
8. I think about what I will be 
doing ten years from now.
F 9. While I may (or may not) be
nervous before taking an 
exam, once I start, I seem 
to forget to be nervous.
D 10. During exams or tests, I block 
on questions to which I know 
the answers, even though I 
might remember them as soon as 
the exam is over.
F 11. Nervousness while taking a 
test helps me to do better.
F 12. When I start a test,
nothing is able to distract 
m e .
13. I spend an hour a day 
talking with my friends 
about topics other than 
those covered in my classes.
F 14. In courses in which the
total grade is based on one 
exam, I seem to do better than 
other people.
D 15. I find that my mind goes
blank at the beginning of an 
exam, and it takes me a few 
minutes before I can function.
(/)
H*
» 4 o p  p
fa 3  O o »-■ I-*
O B 4 p  n Hi £. 3< O CD r-* O rt P  o
(D W f-* K-I pj n> '< V)
r+ %  1 3 (/) rf
1 2 3 4 5
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r 16. 1 look forward to exams.
D 17. I am so tired from worrying 
about an exam that I find I 
almost don't care how well I 
do by the time I start the 
test.
(/)
M*
p o p  p
P 3  O o »-• »-*
O 3 ►S P  O K  3
<  O n> t-* n rt P  on> w ►-> >_i p (C %  U)
M r t %  1 3 in r t
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
18. The pressure on an exam
causes me to do worse than 
the rest of the group under 
similar conditions.
F 19. Although "cramming" under pre­
examination tension is not 
effective for most people, I 
find that if the need arises,
I can learn material immedi­
ately before an exam, even 
under considerable pressure, 
and successfully retain it to 
use on the exam.
20. I enjoy playing practical 
jokes.
F 21. I enjoy taking a difficult 
exam more than an easy one.
22. I tell the instructors in 
my classes my feeling about 
how they conduct their 
classes.
4
4
5
5
5
D 23. I find myself reading exam 
questions without under­
standing them, and I must go 
back over them so that they 
will make sense.
F 24. The more important the exam 
or test, the better I seem 
to d o .
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(/)
H-
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1 2 3 4 s25. I find myself wishing that 
I could get a.decent paying 
job instead of being a 
student.
1) 26. When I don't do well on a
difficult item at the 
beginning of an exam, it 
tends to upset me so that I 
block on even easy questions 
later on.
(All statements preceded by a "D" represent items on the 
Debilitating Anxiety Scale. All statements preceded by an 
"F" represent items on the Facilitating Anxiety Scale.
The statements not preceded by a "D" or an "F" are filler 
items. A respondent's score on each scale is determined by 
adding up the circled numbers which correspond to the 
statements.)
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APPENDIX D
WORRY AND EMOTIONALITY SCALE
SELF-REPORT QUESTIONNAIRE
Name
Date
Directions : Read each of the following statements care­
fully. In the space before each item indicate how you 
feel, a_t this moment, about taking these ability tests. 
Use the following numerical scale:
1. The statement does not describe my feeling, 
condition, etc.
2. The feeling, condition, etc. is barely
noticeable.
3. The feeling, condition, etc. is moderately
intense.
4. The feeling, condition, etc. is strong.
5. The feeling, condition, etc. is very strong.
_W  I do not feel very confident about my performance on
these tests.
JE  I am so nervous that I cannot remember facts which
I really know.
I feel my heart beating fast.
_W  I feel I may not be as well prepared for these tests
as I could be.
E  I am so tense that my stomach is upset.
91
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JV  I am worrying a great deal about these tests.
^   I have an uneasy, upset feeling.
_W  I find myself thinking that the other students who
have taken these tests are probably much brighter 
than I am.
_W  I am thinking about the consequences of doing poorly
on these tests.
E I feel very panicky about taking these tests.
(All statements preceded by a "W" represent items on the 
Worry Scale. All statements preceded by an "E" represent 
items on the Emotionality Scale. A respondent's score on 
each scale is determined by adding up the selected numbers 
which correspond to the statements.)
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APPENDIX E 
CHECK ON MANIPULATION
Name
Date
1. I would like to assess how clear the instructions were 
that I gave you prior to the test administration. Write 
down everything you remember about those instructions.
I would like to assess whether or not you used the 
cognitive strategy described in the instructions. 
First describe that cognitive strategy.
Second, if you became anxious while taking the tests 
did you use the cognitive strategy described? Circle 
the appropriate number.
1 2 3 4 5
Never Always
3. We sometimes find that students differ on the exact 
techniques they use to take a test. Are there any 
special techniques that you use that you think may 
help your performance?
(Question 2 was administered to groups 2-4 only.)
9 3
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APPENDIX F
CREDIBILITY CHECK
DIRECTIONS : For each of the following questions, a 10-
point scale has been provided. Please look closely at 
the ends of each scale. You are to circle the number 
which best represents your answer to each question.
1. How reasonable did the pre-testing instructions to 
employ the cognitive strategy seem to you?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Extremely Moderately Extremely
Unreasonable Reasonable Reasonable
How confident are you that this cognitive strategy 
would be effective in helping students overcome their 
anxiety while taking tests?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Extremely Moderately Extremely
Unconfident Confident Confident
How confident would you be in recommending the use of 
this cognitive strategy to a friend who was extremely 
anxious about taking tests?
I 2 3 4 5 I 1 8 9 ÎÏÏ
Extremely Moderately Extremelv
Unconfident Confident Confident
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4. How successful do you feel this cognitive strategy
would be in decreasing a different fear; for example, 
strong anxiety about making speeches?
1 2 
Extremely 
Unsuccessful
4 5 6
Moderately
Successful
9 10
Extremely 
Successful
5. How confident are you that most college students
experience anxiety when taking tests? That is, they 
worry excessively about their performance and experience 
physiological symptoms such as rapid heart beat, 
trembling hands and sweating while taking exams.
1 2 
Extremely 
Unconfident
4 5 6
Moderately 
Confident
9 10
Extremely 
Confident
(Questions 1-4 were administered to groups 2-4 only. 
Question 5 was administered to all groups.)
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APPENDIX G 
DIGIT SYMBOL TEST (ALTERNATE FORMS)
CODE 14 17 23 59 67 76 86
n ffi > 1 — o (D
PRACTICE 23 17 76 23 76 17 14 59 86 67>æ
1
76 67 17 23 14 67 76 17 86 17 76 17 76 14 59 17 14 23 86 23
17 86 76 59 23 76 86 17 86 23 76 67 17 59 76 '86 59 ' 23 67 14
59 67 17 67 23 76 23 14 86 76 14 23 59 14 17 67 14 86 23 67
14 86 76 14 59 23 14 23 76 67 14 67 59 76 17 76 23 14 86 59
17 59 76 67 17 59 23 86 17 67 17 76 14 17 86 17 86 67 59 14
23 14 23 76 23 17 86 59 17 23 76 86 23 17 14 76 86 23 14
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CODE
25 36 48 62 69 72 91
A A© u □ o
PRACTICE
25 62 91 69 36 72 69 72 36 48
A u
69 48 62 72 69 36 48 62 72 36 91 62 36 48 72 48 69 48 62 69
91 25 62 36 69 72 36 25 62 36 62 36 48 91 36 25 72 91 36 91
36 91 36 72 62 25 91 62 25 36 25 91 69 25 48 91 62 72 91 36
25 72 48 62 36 62 72 91 72 62 36 48 62 48 69 36 91 69 62 48
25 36 25 36 62 69 91 62 36 62 25 48 36 25 48 36 62 25 69 36
25 91 48 91 16 25 72 69 25 72 25 91 48 91 62 36 91 36 25 62
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